In the 1974 Congress passed the latest Antitrust Strategies and you will Penalties Act ("APPA"), also known as the brand new "Tunney Operate The brand new part appetite the new Court to purchase the creation of trick Microsoft files also to require Authorities to make intricate and predictive financial types of the sort previously useful to support concur decrees accompanied due to Tunney Work procedures. " 15 U.S.C. .. 16(b)-(h) (1994), out of concern with "prior practice, which gave the [Justice] Department almost total control of the consent decree process, with only minimal judicial oversight." United states v. American Tel. Tel., 552 F.Supp. 131. 148 (D.D.C. 1982) ("ATT"), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United states, 460 U.S. I001 (1983). To remedy this practice, Congress sought to qeep eliminate "judicial rubber stamping" of such consent decrees, 22 providing that "[b]efore entering any consent judgment . the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public interest." 15 U.S.C. i?§ 16(e). Circuit Judge Aldrich, sitting by designation in You v. Gillette Co., 406 F.Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975) (cited by both the Department and Microsoft), observed upon reviewing the legislative history of the Act: New legislative background shows certainly one to Congress don't intend the newest court's action getting just pro forma, or to be limited by just what seems on the surface. Neither can one disregard the items not as much as that the operate was introduced, demonstrating Congress' desire to demand a check besides into government's expertise -- otherwise no less than, the take action of it -- however, actually towards the their good faith. First, the submissions may be taken as suggesting that the Court should look only to the impact of the proposed decree on the operating system market in determining whether the decree is in the public interest. Pick, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg., at 59,429. The law, however, plainly is otherwise. For example, in United states v. BNS Inc., 858 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1988), -- a case relied upon by the Department -- the Court observed that "the statute suggests that a court may, and perhaps should, look beyond the strict relationship between complaint and remedy in evaluating the public interest." 858 F.2d at 462 (estimating United states v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981)). While the court's public interest determination may not be based on a different market from the one identified in the complaint, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that this did not mean that only effects on that market can or should be considered: Eventually, Area VII of the temporary suggests measures so it Judge might want to consider in order to do so their appropriate character when you look at the Tunney Work proceedings [T]he statute clearly indicates that the court may consider the impact of the consent judgment on the public interest, even though you to impression tends to be towards a not related sphere regarding economic passion. For example, the government's complaint might allege a substantial lessening of competition in the marketing of grain in a specified area. It would be permissible for the court to consider the resulting increase in the price of bread in related areas. Not surprisingly obvious statutory intent, the newest dental and created submissions in the current circumstances enjoys suggested your Court's comment would be circumscribed in many ways not served possibly by the statute otherwise because of the present instance laws Under the Department's own authority, therefore, the Court's inquiry is not limited to the effect of the proposed judgment on the operating system market. To the contrary, the Court can (and, it is submitted, should) determine the effect of the proposed judgment on other areas impacted by Microsoft's monopolistic conduct. As will be discussed in more detail in Section IV, infra, for example, Microsoft has used its illegally acquired market position to leverage into and acquire a monopoly in other related markets. The failure of the decree to "break up or render impotent [this] monopoly power found to be in violation of the Act." ATT, 552 F. Supp. at 150 -- indeed, its tacit decision to leave Microsoft free to profit from its unlawful market power by leveraging into other software markets -- is something that the Court should consider in evaluating the public interest served (or disserved) by the proposed decree.